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A formal analysis of the notion of preference between
deductive arguments
A recent branch of studies within the field of epistemic logic has been the analysis of justi-
fications that an epistemic agent possesses to support one belief or another regarding a specific
topic [1, 3, 2, 4, 5]. Some of the epistemic eﬀects caused by dynamic processes involving justi-
fications, such as evidence elimination caused by communications, have also been studied [11].
Nevertheless, there is something that has not received enough attention yet: how epistemic
agents might prefer certain justifications to others, in order to have better pieces of evidence to
support a particular belief. It seems clear that the manner we prefer one justification to another
for our beliefs depends on a variety of factors. In an ongoing work, we have developed a formal
analysis of the preference between a particular kind of justifications: deductive arguments.
More concretely, let a be an epistemic agent, let ϕ be a proposition and let t,s be a couple of
(possibly diﬀerent) deductive arguments: (i) Which of the arguments (t or s) is preferred by a
if she intends to support ϕ? The motivation for this question and the applications of our answer
are diverse and belong to diﬀerent fields. For example, knowing which argument is better for
a given agent would imply knowing which argument will be selected by her in the context of
an argumentative dialogue. It would also oﬀer an approach to face the problem of how an
agent establishes her beliefs solidly enough to convert them into knowledge. Regarding formal
argumentation theory, an appropriate answer to (i) represents a formal theory of argument
evaluation.
According to our approach, the preference between deductive arguments is reducible to other
notions. In particular, it can be analysed attending to the following list: the syntactic shape of
the arguments, the epistemic attitudes of the agent with respect to the arguments, the sources
from which arguments are taken from or construed, and lastly the quantity and complexity of
information contained in both arguments. We have built a system that is able to capture this
analysis using tools from epistemic logic, justification logic and logics for belief dependence;
and that allows us to reason systematically about particular problems that may arise in this
context. The mentioned system has some natural connections with some published research in
abstract argumentation frameworks (see for example [9, 10]).
Before sketching the analysis we should make clear which kind of situations we are intending
to model. First, we will focus on cases where the goal of argument evaluation is rational inquiry
and where only some initial beliefs, but no knowledge, are available. That is to say, cases where
an agent assesses a couple of arguments in order to decide which of them is better for pursuing
knowledge and truth but where no initial knowledge is accessible to her. This assumption
implies at least two consequences. On the one hand, we suppose that the beliefs of the agent
are the result of some previous epistemic processes, for instance, observations; therefore pure
irrational beliefs are excluded. On the other hand, the sources from which she builds up her
arguments have been previously contrasted somehow. Second, no rhetorical features are taken
into account; the agent will evaluate her arguments regardless of the intention of convincing
anyone else. However, we think that it may be possible to capture some rhetorical features
using the same logical apparatus that will be used in our analysis. Third, in the range of cases
we are studying no time bounds are considered; agents will take as much time as they need
–but always a finite amount– for their evaluations. Fourth, the notion of preference that we
are modelling is claim-related. In other words, we are seeking the best argument for a given
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proposition. This excludes direct applications of the current analysis to the problem of deciding
which proposition of a given set is better supported from the point of view of the agent. Finally,
the resulting theory has a clearly normative character, we do not talk about what epistemic
agents actually do when they evaluate their deductive arguments, but rather what they should
do in order to have the best epistemic standards.
The intuitive picture behind our analysis is that, when comparing two arguments t and s for
supporting a given proposition ϕ, an epistemic agent makes them go through a test consisting
of several filters. As the result of this process, the agent will weakly prefer t to s (prefer t
as much as s) if t has passed at least as many filter as s. The remaining preference concepts
(strict preference, indiﬀerence and incomparability) are defined as usual in the preference logic
literature [6, 7].
The first filter is purely syntactic and we call it syntactic accuracy. If a tries to justify ϕ
using argument t, then it seems rather obvious that the first thing she should require of t is to
have ϕ as its conclusion. In this sense, no semantic notion (true, validity or any other related) is
taken into account at the beggining of the argument evaluation, since a is just checking whether
t and s have the proper syntactic shape. This filter is implemented in our system using the
formal notion of admissibility, taken from [4, 5].
In the second filter, we focus on the epistemic attitudes of the agent towards the premises of
the argument. It seems clear that a will prefer arguments whose premises are believed by her to
arguments whose not. For the time being, we have just studied the case where only the beliefs
of the agent are considered. Although extending this study with (various types of) knowledge,
for example using plausibility models, looks like a promising idea for future developments. Be
as it may, if this filter is passed too, what else could she do for deciding which argument is
better? The answer is provided by the third filter.
In the third filter the agent turns her attention to her best advisor on the topic. Once her
beliefs have been found to be insuﬃcient to decide which argument is better, she seeks help in
the other agents of the system. Notice that the best advisor is understood here in a broad sense
(it could be a human being, a computer or an encyclopedia), i.e., the best advisor means the
best source for the agent regarding the topic. This idea is taken from [8]; but some changes
are made in order to fulfil our theoretical intentions. Unfortunately for our agent, it might
be the case that her best advisor is not suﬃciently informed to tell her what to do; since she
(the advisor) could also consider t and s equally good. However, we could still establish some
criteria to make her decide.
Finally, in the fourth and fifth filter; the agent checks the simplicity of the arguments (and
she prefers, of course, the simplest). The diﬀerence between these two requirements is that the
former is related to the to the manner in which the information is structured in the arguments
the latter is related to the quantity of information contained in the arguments. These two filters
could be understood as a new version of Ockham’s razor. It is not straightforward which of the
requirements should be considered more important, since we could think of counter-examples
for the two hierarchies. However, we decided to take the complexity of information as more
important than the quantity of information and we oﬀer several reasons for doing so.
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